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Executive summary 
Aim and method 
The study specifies potential bottlenecks in the supply of material resources due to effective 
climate policy in the longer term towards 2050, but indicates longer duration developments 
as well. A second part of the analysis is about how such bottlenecks may strategically be 
overcome. The focus is on the metallic elements. Demand for climate related technologies is 
additional to rising demand due to economic growth in general and the build-up of 
infrastructure in developing countries specifically. Growth is not neutral as to shares of 
different metals, but increasingly shifts to smaller amounts of much larger numbers of 
metals, as related to ICT developments. This tendency is also present in climate and energy 
technologies. The question which metals will be required, and in which quantities, depends 
on the technologies being used, their metals-specific composition and the volumes involved. 
Neither of these variables can be specified with any certainty. Most electric cars use 
neodymium permanent magnets but Tesla uses variable field copper electromagnets. Similar 
holds for wind power. Which of these will be the dominant magnet metals in 2050 is 
substantially open. 
However, there are substantial similarities between groups of technologies in their metals 
demand to make scenarios based on specific technology assumptions relevant, as 
representative for the broader but mostly unknown domain of future technologies. So we 
used one of the most technology specific scenarios for 2050 now available, see Koning et al 
2014. It is a detailed input-output specification of the economy in 2050. The metals 
requirements to be met can be specified as flows per year. In the build-up stage of stocks of 
metals in products and installations, recycling does not yet play a role. So it is not just flows 
per year but also the stock requirements for having the installations functioning which play a 
role in assessing bottlenecks in metals demand for the coming decades. Of course such 
bottlenecks are additive to the ones coming up due to general economic development. All 
metals demand is global, with production, spatially concentrated or not, for such global 
markets. 
The match between supply and demand is not a mechanical one, or simply linking economic 
supply and demand curves. It is long term market expectations which determine production 
development and expected production constraints which influence demand development 
and hence expected demand. In these somewhat soft surroundings strategies are to be 
developed to avoid bottlenecks, especially where  price peaks do not lead to relevant supply 
increases as for example due to long gestation periods in opening up new mines. Such 
strategies partly are public policy oriented, but partly also based on well-founded analysis, 
such knowledge directing technologies and markets in directions with low supply risks.  
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Quantification of climate policy related resource demand 
The quantification of resource demand focuses on a number of key sectors: electricity 
production; energy transformation and transport systems; road transport; and Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS).  
Potential bottlenecks 
Potential bottlenecks will be there where growth rates starting from current production 
levels towards “2050” production are to be high, in the order of more than 2 or 3%. When 
current production is still negligible, as is the case with several rare earths, this growth rate is 
however not meaningful. Also metals coproduced with a major bulk metal can pose different 
kind of bottlenecks: expanding production of the main product, like copper, iron or zinc, is 
hardly possible economically for trace metals in the order of less than a percent of the major 
metal. Also metals where opening up new mines takes up to decades, like for copper, cannot 
substantially respond to market signals in economically relevant time periods. 
Global demand and supply for metals resources 
Global demand will rise generally due to economic growth and specifically for new 
technologies as in IT related developments. The build-up stage of infrastructure in developing 
countries will require substantial amounts of metals and other minerals in the coming half 
century, with recycling playing hardly a role.  Effective climate policy will require additional 
resources, both related to bulk materials, like iron and copper; intermediate materials like 
lithium; alloying materials like nickel and chromium; and specialty materials available in small 
quantities, like rare earth elements, and really rare elements like indium, and tellurium. 
Demand development, including demand related to effective climate policy, must reckon 
with overall supply limitations: there is more iron available for mining than gold in this world; 
no technology can change that.  
Insight in these constraints is a most basic strategic issue, where governments can contribute 
through research funding. 
Demand for climate technologies detailed 
Demand for climate policy related development depends on the technologies that will be 
implemented. A distinction can be made as to major technologies for emission reduction 
being used. An emphasis on CCS related developments will require substantial transport 
infrastructure for CO2, with demand for iron and alloying metals like nickel, and chromium 
increasing substantially. 
A more renewables oriented developments would require a broad set of elements from the 
periodic system. Specifics depend on the choice from a set of known technologies in wind 
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and solar power and on as yet unknown technologies, specifically for PV which in the long 
term is likely to provide the bulk of renewable energy.  
Both systems would require substantial electrification, including that of most transport, as 
decentralized use of carbon containing fuels will have to be reduced to near zero. However, 
the intermittent nature of most renewables will also lead to substantial energy buffering and 
storage requirements. Current developments cannot yet indicate winning technologies in this 
arena, so precise demand predictions are hardly possible. However, low carbon energy 
certainly will substantially increase materials demand per MJ, for a broad range of metal 
resources. 
Detailed technology scenarios, more and more detailed than now are used in this analysis, 
would help create insight in demand requirements for effective climate policy. 
 
Market related supply constraints for climate technologies 
Market related supply constraints first relate to the unavoidable limitations in geological 
resource availability. Within these boundaries, supply constraints depend on the cost of 
extraction and processing, to be matched by price. Depletion of the most rich and easily 
approachable ores will increase costs while technology improvement reduces costs. The net 
effect will differ per resource and groups of combined resources, like rare earths.  A 
complicating factor is that many elements are produced as minor co-products. When such co-
production is not fully exploited yet this will make upscaling production easy, involving the 
processing stage only. Once this option is fully exploited upscaling of production will be 
extremely expensive.  Predictions are hard to make in specific cases. There has been an often 
exponentially rising trend in almost all metals produced, without a clear direction in price 
development in the last century. That is the situation to reckon with: substantial uncertainty 
and no clear tendency in price. 
However, climate policy adds a new uncertainty. How sure can miners be that climate policy 
indeed will be successful? An extreme but important example can clarify the importance of 
this uncertainty. Relevant miners assume policy success and start opening up copper mines 
to deliver the required amounts.  Demand will rise in the next decades. The new copper 
mines invested in will come to full production after in the order of up to 25 years.  The match 
is perfect. If however climate policy is delayed, the demand expansion will not occur and 
copper prices will collapse. Most copper miners will then write red figures till the most costly 
mines and least financially viable companies will have closed down.  
The high uncertainty on climate policy makes any investment for that future supply a high 
risk investment, with a substantial chance on loss. This implies that if successful climate 
policy would come about, there nearly certain will be a shortage of copper supply, with prices 
then spiralling. For metals where production can be expanded more easily and fast, like 
lithium, this is much less the case. 
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The most basic issue in having the supply needed in successful climate policy is to reduce 
demand uncertainty: make effective climate policy really credible. 
 
Recycling and substitution 
Long term demand for virgin resources is not absolute per resource. Improved recycling 
reduces primary demand. This factor can become important only after the build-up stage has 
been substantially completed. For much fixed and mobile infrastructure, including ships, 
trains and airplanes, this build-up stage can take half a century and or more. 
Substitution is a major route to avoid specific depletion. The supply problems with 
neodymium (due to political constraints) for ultra-strong magnets can be avoided by using 
electromagnets instead. This choice has been made by Tesla, but not by other car builders, 
accepting a slightly lower efficiency of the electromotor’ s/dynamo’s, but avoiding supply 
risks.  It seems that such considerations, not to rely on resources with possibly restricted 
supply, is being broader adopted now in technology development. However, in deeper 
innovations as for example in near-zero resistance electricity transport, public research 
seems required, then avoiding reliance on possibly too expensive copper. 
Setting up relevant recycling systems, including product requirements like demountability, 
are essential now already for shorter life time applications, but in the long run for all 
products and installations. 
Political and monopolistic supply constraints 
Monopolistic behaviour is possible with one producer dominating the global market. It also  is 
possible through state action, where one country has an overarching position in supply, as in 
the case of export restrictions of rare earth elements by China, especially neodymium. There 
are two mutually exclusive routes to keep such actions at bay. One is to make long term 
bilateral arrangements with the producer or producer country. If all user countries do so, an 
inflexible system results, with extreme price volatility for the tiny open market left. With 
prices in the open market rising to a manifold of the contract prices, contractual supplies just 
will not be met, seems a safe prediction from past experience. 
The other option is to prevent private monopolies and bring the supply of resources more 
forcefully in the open market domain, as organized in the WTO.  This will not function fully 
and not always. Especially smaller countries don’t have other options than this one. 
Defeating short term actions by near monopolist countries could be countered by building up 
strategic reserves by consumer countries of the metals involved. The cost of setting up, which 
will drive up prices, and of maintaining such reserves are substantial. If that action is 
successful and monopolistic behaviour does not occur, the full costs of having the reserve are 
for the organizing party as a full loss, with additional profits for the producer country. 
Bringing the reserves on the market will depress prices. The experience with the UNCTAD  
resource funds have not been positive. The strategic stock building in the US in 1950s has  led 
to the collapse of domestic mining as domestic markets were taken over by foreign 
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producers. Private speculation with silver by the Hunt brothers has proven that costs of 
maintaining reserves can be very high: they lost their fortunes. 
Monopolistic misbehaviour is to be reduced by antitrust policies, and where countries are 
involved by clarifying WTO rules and developing most direct sanctions. For all metals with 
monopolistic risks research for substitution is to be publicly supported. 
Key conclusions 
o Uncertainty on supply and demand of metals has always been substantial and will 
remain so. 
o Successful climate policy would require substantial additional supply, which could be 
part of the usual investment considerations on metals and mining firms. 
o The high uncertainty on having successful climate policy will lead to substantial 
though temporary shortages.  
o Substitution can to some extent avoid reliance on metals with supply uncertainty. 
o Shortages, as severe price peaks with limited supply reaction, will be most severe for 
metals: 
o where increasing the mining and processing capacity takes a long time, 
with copper as a prime example (>20 years) 
o with a low concentration metals co-produced with bulk metals like some 
rare earths, and indium and tellurium in some iron, zinc and copper ores  
o where near monopolistic supply makes disturbance possible.  
o Monopolistic behaviour can best be approached through antitrust policy where firms 
are involved. Where governments can play that role strengthening of WTO rules 
seems the only direct policy option, combined with research to create substitution for 
the metals or products containing that metal.  
o When capacity can be increased with short lead times and without substantial price 
rises, such shortages will hardly play a role, as for lithium.  
o Avoiding the reliance on metals with potential shortages seems a key strategy for 
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1 Introduction 
Key elements of an effective climate policy require that by 2050 the energy production and 
consumption systems are substantially changed relative to the current energy production and 
consumption systems. These possible future low carbon energy systems require different 
amounts and different types of materials than the current existing energy production and 
consumption systems. For instance the amount of materials associated with the production 
of electricity with a wind turbine is much larger than the production of the same amount of 
electricity with a conventional coal power plant. The sheer size of the energy production and 
consumption system means that a change of this system might be limited by the supply of 
the materials needed for the low carbon energy systems. To be able to limit average global 
warming to about 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, a 80% reduction of GHGs may be required 
(IPCC, 2014) by 2050, a figure adopted by the European Union in established policies. Thus 
the change in energy systems must not only be substantial, it is also to be accomplished in 
about 35 years’ time. The speed by which new resources are discovered and new mines can 
come into operation might therefore be a bottleneck for the energy transition as well. Well-
founded expectations on the certainty of future demand for metals are important for 
investments in new mines to take place. 
In this report it is investigated if resource constraints can be a bottleneck for formulating 
successful climate policies. If there are bottlenecks, policy measures that might alleviate 
future resource problems are investigated. Resources that will be investigated are metallic 
resources like bulk metals such as iron and aluminium. Of specific interest are rare earth 
metals (Kleijn et al., 2011) that play a large role in many high efficiency low carbon energy 
technologies such as batteries and electromagnets. An overview of these rare earth metals 
and their applications in energy technologies can be found in (Eliseeva & Bu, 2011). A 
successful climate policy is assumed to be a policy in which there is a high change that 
average global warming is limited to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, requiring emission 
reductions up to 80% by 2050. 
Not investigated are bottlenecks of minerals resources such as sand, clay, stone. Sand, clay 
and stone are ubiquitous available and are locally mined and used mostly. There might be 
local resource constraints (e.g. when building a dam) but it seems unlikely that the supply will 
become a global problem. Another resource problem not investigated is the supply of 
fertilizer minerals (phosphate minerals) and biomass for energy production. These two issues 
are of utmost importance because many of the 2 °C GHG emission scenarios rely more or less 
on the use of biomass for energy production, potentially competing for land that is also used 
for food, feed and fibre production (Tilman et al, 2009), and for nature. However the biomass 
supply constraints need to be studied with a different analytical framework and requires 
separate study. 
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Answering the main question of this study is difficult to say the least. The following issues are 
at play: 
o How a successful climate policy scenario looks like in 2050 is not known. Different 
scenarios, with different sets of energy technologies can be envisaged. 
o It is uncertain how energy technologies will develop the coming 35 years’ time and 
what their metal requirements will be. 
o It is unknown if new metal substitution possibilities will become available the coming 
35 years. 
o While absolute supply of metals can be inferred from concentrations in the earth 
mantle the supply that matters is the metal that can and will be mined economically. 
The actual supply of metals is highly dependent on the prices that can be paid, the 
investments that are made to open up mines, and political constraints. 
Given the above it is likely that there will be order of magnitude uncertainties when it comes 
to establish demand as well as supply of metals in scenarios of successful climate policies. 
Nonetheless it might be possible to examine if there are possible metal resource constraints 
that need to be taken into account when formulating successful climate policy by examining 
boundary cases. 
To make an assessment of the possible metal resource bottlenecks the following research 
questions will be addressed: 
o What might be an educated guess for the demand for metals in the year 2050. 
Preferably the guess should err on the high side. 
o What would be a ballpark figure for the total demand for metals to build up the new 
energy production and consumption system from 2000 until 2050, i.e. the cumulative 
amount of metals needed until 2050 in case of successful climate policy is 
implemented. Again the guess should err on the high side. 
o What is the current rate of metal extraction and how does it compare the current 
actual demand and expected demand for metals in 2050. 
o What are the current economic reserves and how does it compare to the expected 
total metal demand until 2050. 
o In how far can substitution between materials and recycling solve possible conflicts 
between supply and demand taken a 35 years’ time technological progress. 
o Are there bottlenecks in the speed by which the mines can be scaled up both from a 
technical as well as business/investment point of view. 
o Are there specific political supply risks where the supply of a single metal is controlled 
by a single country or single firm, a key issue in criticality (EC, 2014). 
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The report starts with a description of the methodological framework used to make an 
educated guess of the metal demand until 2050. Then the results of this analysis are 
confronted with the values on available metal resources and metal supply rate. These results 
are discussed in the light of other important factors that might influence the long term supply 
and demand of metals. 
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2 Materials and Methods 
2.1 Analytical framework 
The research framework is as follows. First two ball park figures for the demand for metals in 
2050 are estimated on the basis of two scenarios. One scenario is a business as usual (BAU) 
scenario until 2050. This BAU scenario is a scenario in which historical developments, 
including efficiency improvements, are extrapolated until 2050. This scenario has been 
described in De Koning et al. (2014, 2015). GHG emissions in the BAU scenario are on a 
trajectory towards an 8 °C global warming, similar to the RCP8.5 BAU scenario (De Koning et 
al., 2015; IPCC 2014). The second scenario is a Techno Scenario (TS) in which all probable and 
possible technical CO2 emission reduction measures currently envisaged have been 
implemented in 2050. It is a techno-optimistic scenario that for instance includes CCS on all 
the remaining fossil fuel power plants, widespread introduction of electrical vehicles and 
complete electrification of household heating. It is important to note that this TS does not yet 
correspond to a scenario where the average global warming is limited to 2 °C. Instead the TS 
brings us on a trajectory of about 4 °C average global warming similar to the RCP4.5 scenarios 
(IPCC, 2014). GDP growth in the BAU scenario and TS follows projections made by the OECD 
(2012). The TS is not an example of successful climate policy as we defined successful climate 
policy which realises a 2 °C temperature rise at the maximum. According to our analysis, only 
our techno-optimistic scenario in combination with a rate of economic growth slower than 
those predicted by the OECD (2012) can keep global emissions within a 2 °C limit. Instead of 
an yearly average global GDP growth of 2.3%, the growth rate would need about 1% per year. 
A truly successful climate policy would therefore entail a TS with a reduced growth rate, 
lowering the demand for products and energy and hence associated metal resources 
compared to the TS. The estimate of the metal resources needed in the TS are therefore a 
high mark for the demand of metals. Another option would be to believe in as yet unknown 
technologies saving us. Fundamental innovations can however hardly be available in full 
quantity within 35 years.  
 
The yearly demand for metals required in the BAU and TS in 2050 is estimated using data 
about metal requirements of different energy sources, coupled to scenarios of the energy 
market and together with expected growth scenarios of other sectors such that an overall 
expected demand of the most relevant metals is obtained.  How the metal requirements of 
different electricity generation technologies, road vehicles, buildings and other infrastructure 
are taken into account is discussed in Section 2.2 - 2.5.  
The high mark yearly metal demand results of the TS 2050 are subsequently compared with 
the current yearly metal demand and supply.  These TS 2050 results can next be used to 
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make get a high mark ball park figure for the total amount of metals to be extracted until 
2050 which can be compared to available reserves. 
 
 
2.2 Electricity generation technologies 
In this section the metal requirements of photovoltaics, wind, hydropower, fossil fuel and 
concentrated solar electricity generation technologies are described. The cradle-to-grave 
metal requirements of these technologies are taken from a wide range of literature sources 
and LCA databases. It should be noted that these are the metal requirements of the 
technologies as they currently exit. By 2050 the metal requirements of the technologies have 
likely decreased in general due to ongoing technological progress. For specific metals and 
specific applications material use might increase. 
2.2.1 Photovoltaics 
Moss et al. (2011) was used as a basis for the metal requirements of PV panels. Moss et al. 
give an extensive overview for the metal requirement of several energy sources and also give 
an inventory of different forms of PV panels and which are currently under development. 
Common metals with low scarcity like aluminium and iron are not accounted for in in the 
research of Moss et al. (2011). These data were taken from Laleman et al. (2013). 
To convert the data from Moss et al. (2011) to the metal requirements per MWh, the data 
was corrected for the lifetime of the PV panels (25 years), yearly energy production and the 
capacity factor (20%) both based on (EIA, 2014). 
The requirements of aluminium and iron for PV were obtained from Laleman et al. (2013). 
This source was chosen because it focuses on metals required for installing the modules and 
different types of PV modules are included. The data is presented as the amount of iron and 
aluminium per m2 of module. To determine the metal requirements per MWh the yearly 
energy production was calculated using the data given in the article. For the yearly irradiation 
1300 kWh/m2/year was used, because this is an average of the irradiation at different 
locations, however it is very well possible that PV panels will be mainly used in areas with 
higher or lower irradiation levels. Additionally a lifetime of 25 years was assumed (EIA, 2014) 
and data from the Ecoinvent LCA database was used if multiple data sources were presented. 
Finally the metal requirements were adjusted for the assumed technology mix of different 
types of PV panels in Moss et al. (2011). 
 
2.2.2 Wind 
For the metal requirements of wind energy Moss et al. (2011) was also used. The data was 
converted to the requirements per MWh in the same way as described for PV. A lifetime of 
25 years was assumed (Wilburn, 2011) and a capacity factor of 30% (EIA, 2014). The 
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requirement of iron and aluminium was obtained from Wilburn (2011). This research also 
focuses on the future developments of wind turbine technology and the effect on the 
average metal requirement, in contrast to a single type of turbine. The same method and 
assumptions were applied as for the Moss et al. (2011) data to convert the figures to 
kg/MWh. In the total aluminium demand is 1% of the iron requirement, therefore the 
aluminium requirement is set to 1% of the iron requirement.   
 
2.2.3 Hydroelectricity 
For the metal requirements of hydroelectricity data from da Silva et al. (2013) was used. This 
however is a case study, but the number of studies on the metal requirements of 
hydroelectricity is very limited. However, the authors compare their results to results of 
other studies and find they are in the same order of magnitude. 
 
2.2.4 Natural Gas, Coal & CCS 
The metal requirements for natural gas and coal electricity generation with and without CCS 
have been adopted from van der Giesen (2008). 
 
2.2.5 Nuclear 
For nuclear electricity the metal requirements have been obtained from Moss et al. (2011) 
and calculated in the same way as described for PV. A capacity factor of 90% and a lifetime of 
60 years are assumed (Keppler and Cometto 2012). Additional sources are needed for 
assessing the requirements of iron and aluminium but these have not been found. Iron and 
aluminium are currently not considered for nuclear power generation. 
 
2.2.6 Concentrated solar power 
The metal requirements for Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) electricity is based on a case 
study of two different advanced solar technologies, parabolic through and tower (Pihl et. al. 
2012). The metal requirements per MWh are calculated with the yearly energy production 
per installed capacity and the given lifetime (30 years), combined with the requirements for 
maintenance. Parabolic Through is currently the most deployed form of advanced solar 
power (CSP today, n.d.), therefore only this form of CSP is taken into account in the final 
metal demand. However it is possible that other forms of CSP will become a significant part 
of the market in the near future, and then the metal requirements need to be corrected for 
the market share of the different CSP technologies. 
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2.2.7 Electricity production mix 
Scenarios developed in WP3 by De Koning et al. (2014, 2015) are used. In this work two 
scenarios are presented with 2000 as base year. An extrapolation of current trends (BAU) and 
a techno scenario (TS) that assumes the large-scale implementation of probable technologies 
that will substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For this work the initial energy data 
from the scenarios had to be specified  further, as to which energy technology will produce 
which amount of electricity. This was done for the TS by taking the total energy production 
from the mix calculation table and combining that with the specified data of the energy mix.  
For the base year a more specified dataset was created. This data was used to calculate the 
more specified requirements for BAU scenario by calculating the distribution of the different 
energy technologies and combining that with the total energy demand in that scenario. 
 
 
2.3 Land vehicles 
2.3.1 Number of vehicles 
To determine the effects of the electrification of the transport sector the number of the 
different types of vehicles in the different scenarios needs to be estimated. The current 
analysis is limited to passenger cars. The basic data is taken from the motor vehicles 
production sector in the different scenarios. This is monetary data not corrected for inflation. 
The total production of motor vehicles (not sold vehicles) in 2000 was 41 million (OICA n.d.). 
Combination with the monetary data gives an average of k€40 per car. In fact this figure is a 
simplification and does not give the actual production cost of a car, since the value 
represents the total value of the sector and the sector also consists of production of other 
goods such as trailers and trolleys or more expensive types of cars such as SUVs or hybrids. 
This number will be used as a rough estimation that is used to calculate the future production 
of vehicles in 2050 but only after it is corrected for the relative price difference for different 
types of vehicles in comparison to a fossil fuel driven vehicles, based on EPRI (2004). It is 
assumed that gasoline and diesel vehicles have the same relative price. However, in EPRI 
(2004) different types of cars (Passenger and City car) are compared in the sections on hybrid 
and electric vehicles (EV), so the relative price of hybrid and EV is determined according to 
the type of vehicle that they are compared to in the article. 
 
In De Koning et al. (2014) the market share of gasoline, diesel, battery-electric, hybrid-electric 
and plug-in hybrid vehicles are specified for the base case and the Techno scenario. The share 
of the different types of vehicles is assumed to be the same for the business as usual scenario 
(BAU) and base year. Together with the monetary data of the sector in the different scenarios 
and the relative price of the vehicles the number of the different types of vehicles is 
determined. 
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2.3.2 Metal requirements 
Data from Burnham (2012) is used to determine the metal demand per type of vehicle, since 
Burnham (2012) focuses on the metal demand of all the vehicle types specified in our 
scenarios. Data on the amount and distribution of the different metals in the vehicles and 
batteries are used to determine the requirements of the different types of metals per vehicle.  
However for the electric engine no data is given for the requirements of metals such as 
neodymium that are sometimes present in the permanent magnets in electric motors. 
Therefore, Hawkins et. al. (2012) is use to determine the more specific metal requirements 
for electric engines. This data is converted to the metal requirements per weight of the 
electric engine and together with the data of the weight of the electric engines the 
requirements of the metals that are not specified in Burnham (2012) are determined.  
Some additional assumptions have been made to obtain the metal demand. It was assumed 
that metal categories copper/brass (in the vehicle weight) and electronic parts (in the Li-ion 
battery) consisted of mostly copper. Additionally for the materials of which the chemical 
formula is given the requirements of the specific elements are determined according to their 
molecular weight. 
 
2.4 Infrastructure and building construction 
By far the largest amount of mineral and metal resources in the world are used in the 
construction sector. The construction sector provides such diverse products as bridges, 
motorways, canals, airfields, private houses, and factory buildings, including all wiring, 
plumbing and other building products that are needed to make a complete building. 
The calculation of the amounts of metals used in the current worldwide construction work is 
problematic because such diverse products are produced by the construction sectors. A 
bottom-up analysis where detailed data for specific construction products are collected and 
subsequently scaled up to world level will likely be unsuccessful. 
Instead a top-down approach has been used to make a rough estimate of the current and 
future rates of metal resource use. The same data and models used to make the different 
GHG emissions scenarios (De Koning et al., 2014, 2015) were exploited to calculate cradle – 
to – grave metal resource use associated with construction. To do so the EXIOBASE supply-
and-use tables (SUTs) which form the basis for specifying the GHG scenarios where extended 
with information about metal ore extraction data. Similar to the calculation of GHG emissions 
associated with the consumption of specific products, also the metal ore extraction 
associated with the consumption of products could be calculated. 
The number of metal ores that could be distinguished by this approach is limited. These 
metal ores categories are shown in Table 2-1. The estimated metal content of the ore has 
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based on an overview of average metal content of ores presented by Philips and Edwards 
(1976). 
 
Table 2-1 Metal ores that could be associated with construction work in the top – down analysis 
Ore Element Me content (kg Me/kg ore) 
iron ores Fe 0.147 
bauxite and aluminium ores Al 0.111 
copper ores Cu 5.21x10
-3
 
lead ores Pb 5.11x10
-2
 
nickel ores Ni 3.88x10
-3
 
tin ores Sn 6.76x10
-3
 
uranium and thorium ores U 5.65x10
-4
 
zinc ores Zn 2.82x10
-2
 
precious metal ores ? ? 
rare earthes ores ? ? 
other metal ores ? ? 
 
Bulk metal use in EXIOBASE is well represented but precious metals and rare earth metal use 
of the construction work cannot be estimated.  
Using the data in Table 2-1 the global metal resource use in the actual year 2000 could be 
calculated and the metal resource use per unit of construction work output. The global metal 
resource use in the BAU 2050 scenario and TC 2050 were subsequently calculated by 
multiplying the output of the construction sector taken from the BAU 2050 and TC 2050 with 
the metal use per unit of output as calculated for the actual year 2000. Thus we assume that 
there is no change in the amount of metals being used in construction work in 2050.  
 
2.5 Transmission & buffering 
The amount of additional transmission and storage that is required depends on the share of 
intermittent renewable energy technologies, such as wind, CSP and PV.  Buffering can be 
provided by either getting electricity from other areas with long distance transmission or 
more local storage. However, since the share of renewable technologies that require 
additional transmission or buffering is only 0,20% for the BAU scenario and 6% for the techno 
scenario, buffering is provided from the remaining 94-99% of the production. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Metal resource use by energy generation technologies 
In Table 3-1 the metal requirements of the different energy technologies investigated are 
presented. 
Table 3-1 Life cycle metal requirements for the different energy technologies expressed in kg/MWh.  



































Pihl et al., 
2012 
Fe 4.65 1.46 0.138 1.11 1.46 1.34 2.14 0
*
 8.07 
Al 3.69 1.46E-02   8.00E-03 1.00E-02 3.20E-02 4.70E-02 0
*
 6.98E-03 
Cu 0.370 1.74E-02 2.45E-03 6.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.20E-02 1.80E-02 1.26E-04 2.92E-02 
Ni   1.01E-02   2.60E-02 4.30E-02 3.10E-02 6.60E-02 5.40E-04 8.59E-03 
Cr   1.37E-02   7.00E-03 1.30E-02 6.00E-03 1.70E-02 9.02E-04 2.01E-02 
In 1.03E-04             3.38E-06   
Nd   6.18E-04               
Dy   4.26E-05               
Cd 1.39E-04             1.06E-06   
Ag 4.38E-04             1.75E-05 1.23E-04 
Mo   2.08E-03   1.00E-03 1.00E-03 4.00E-03 7.00E-03 1.50E-04 1.83E-03 
Mn   1.23E-03     1.00E-03 4.00E-03 7.00E-03   1.83E-02 
Pb 9.36E-02             9.09E-06   
Ga 2.74E-06                 
Se 7.42E-05                 
Sn 1.06E-02             9.72E-06   
Te 1.07E-04                 
Hf               1.01E-06   
W               1.06E-05   
Y               1.06E-06   
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Nb               4.23E-06 0 
Zr               6.45E-05   
V               1.27E-06 1.74E-05 
Ti               3.17E-06 2.28E-04 
Zn         1.00E-03 1.00E-03 3.00E-03   5.94E-03 
Mg                 2.83E-02 
* The cradle to gate metal requirements are not known and set to zero 
 
The metal requirements of the different energy production technologies given in Table 3-1 
can be combined with the production volumes as specified by the different scenarios. The 
energy production volumes are given in Table 3-2. The energy production mix and volumes 
for the year 2050 are largely based on EMF-21 scenario study described by Jakeman and 
Fisher (2010). 
Table 3-2 Energy production of different energy technologies for the year 2000 and BAU and techno scenario (De Koning 








EJ EJ EJ 
Nuclear 9.3 31.7 31.5 
Solar PV 0.0 0,0 1.9 
Advanced Solar     3.9 
Wind 0.1 0.4 3.6 
Bio-energy (including waste for 2000 & BAU) 4.6 15.8 0.0 
Coal 21.5 73.2 18.4 
Gas 9.9 33.8 19.6 
Coal + CCS     15.1 
Gas + CCS     15.2 
Bio-energy + CCS     4.4 
Hydro (Including  Geo-thermal for Techno) 9.3 31.6 48.2 
CHP 0.0 0.0   
Total 54,8 186.6 161.9 
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Notice that the introduction of CCS on bio-energy leads to removal of CO2 from the 
atmosphere in the TS. 
 
3.2 Metal resource use by new cars 
In Table 3-3 the number of produced vehicles in the different scenarios and the base year is 
presented, based on the final consumption volume of cars as available in the scenarios 
developed by De Koning et al. (2014). Additionally the relative price of the different vehicle 
types is presented based on EPRI (2004). 
 
Table 3-3: The relative price of different vehicle types and the number of the vehicles produced in the actual  year 2000,  
the 2050 BAU scenario, and 2050 techno scenario 
Type of vehicle Relative price 
Number of new cars (million) 
Actual Year 2000 BAU Scenario 2050 Techno Scenario 2050 
Gasoline 1.00 31.45 69.06 2.38 
Diesel 1.00 8.66 18.88 5.85 
Full-electric 1.36 0.00 0.00 43.58 
Hybrid-electric 0.97 1.08 1.89 7.98 
Plug in Hybrid-electric 1.01 0.00 0.00 41.77 
Total  41.18 89.83 101.57 
The metal requirements of the different vehicle technologies taken from the literature as 
discussed in Section 2.3.2 are presented in Table 3-4. Both batteries and engines have been 
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Plug-in Hybrid Electric 
Vehicle 
Electric Vehicle 
kg/vehicle kg/vehicle kg/vehicle kg/vehicle 
Fe 964 1016 1047 1295 
Al 92 105 119 244 
Cu 26 66 79.4 166 
Mg 0.27 0,29 0.30 0.39 
Ni 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pt 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pb 11.3 6.89 6.89 6.89 
Li   0.21 1.09 8.43 
Mn   3.05 16.0 125 
Nd   0.01 0.01 0.03 
B   0.01 0.01 0.03 
 
 
3.3 Metal resource use in construction 
The calculated metal resource use in construction work in the actual year 2000, the BAU 
scenario and TC in 2050 are given in Table 3-5. 
 
Table 3-5 Metal requirements for construction work in kg/year 
Metal Actual Year 2000 BAU Scenario 2050 Techno Scenario 2050 
Fe 3.23 x 10
10
 7.91 x 10
10
 7.93 x 10
10
 
Al 2.97 x 10
9
 8.00 x 10
9
 8.02 x 10
9
 
Cu 2.16 x 10
9
 5.95 x 10
9
 5.97 x 10
9
 
Pb 3.69 x 10
8
 1.02 x 10
9
 1.02 x 10
9
 
Ni 1.47 x 10
8
 4.30 x 10
8
 4.31 x 10
8
 
Sn 2.38 x 10
8
 7.10 x 10
8
 7.12 x 10
8
 
U 1.88 x 10
6
 5.94 x 10
6
 5.96 x 10
6
 
Zn 1.31 x 10
9
 4.10 x 10
9





Page 23  |  Resource constraints in successful climate policy 
 
3.4 Total metal resource use  
The total yearly metal resource use, summing up the use of metals by land vehicles, new 
construction work and energy systems is given in Table 3-6. Because a limited number of 
metals could be taken into account when calculating the amount of metals in construction 
work (see Section 2.4), the total yearly metal resource use could be calculated for a limited 
number of metals only. The values given for chromium, indium, neodymium, dysprosium, and 
lithium are based on the metal use of electricity generation technologies and land vehicles 
only.  
 
Table 3-6 Total global yearly metal demand for the actual year 2000, BAU 2050 scenario and Techno 2050 scenario for the 
electricity production sector, construction work and land vehicles together. The supply data for Fe, Al, Cu, and Ni have 
been taken from EXIOBASE for the year 2000. The supply data for Cr, In, Nd, Dy and Li have been taken from the USGS for 
the year 2000.    
 Total metal demand from electricity production  





















Fe 8.35 x 1010 2.05  x 1011 2.38  x 1011 1.60  x 1011 0.52 1.28 1.49 
Al 6.99  x 109 1.70  x 1010 2.77  x 1010 2.29  x 1010 0.30 0.74 1.21 
Cu 3.35  x 109 8.66  x 109 1.77  x 1010 9.15  x 109 0.37 0.95 1.94 
Ni 4.05  x 108 1.31  x 109 1.21  x 109 4.36  x 108 0.93 3.00 2.79 
Cr 5.75  x 107 1.96  x 108 2.40  x 108 6.98  x 109 0.01 0.03 0.03 
In 8.78  x 103 2.99  x 104 8.41  x 104 5.73  x 105 0.02 0.05 0.15 
Nd 1.34  x 104 2.35  x 104 2.80  x 106 1.80  x 107 0.00 0.00 0.16 
Dy 0 0 4.66  x 104 1.00  x 105 0.00 0.00 0.47 
Li 2.22  x 105 3.88  x 105 4.14  x 108 3.82  x 108 0.00 0.00 1.08 
 
As can be seen in Table 3-6 the sum metal use as calculated from the use by the electricity 
generation technologies, land vehicles and construction work does not equal yearly mine 
production in 2000/2008. The technologies that are explicitly taken into account use a large 
share of the mined bulk metals iron, aluminium, copper and nickel. However that cannot be 
said for the metals chromium, indium, neodymium, dysprosium, and lithium. Only a very 
small fraction of the mining supply is taken up by electricity generation technologies, land 
vehicles and construction work. Likely most of these metals are used in electronics, glass and 
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ceramics and these applications are not accounted for in the calculation of the demand of 
metals in Table 3-6. 
Notice the very large increase in the demand for neodymium and lithium in the TS, 
considering the electricity production sector, building sector and land vehicles together. 
Expected increase in the use of neodymium is a factor 200 and for lithium the demand is 
even 2000 times higher in the electricity production sector, construction work and land 
vehicles applications. However, while looking at these sectors only the rise in demand seems 
dramatic, the overall rise in demand (see Table 3-7) is much less pronounced, something like 
a factor 3-4. 
To make an assessment of the demand for metals in products that have not been taken into 
account explicitly, we assume that yearly metal mining supply and demand are by and large 
in balance, and that recycling can be neglected. The gap between mining supply and demand 
as shown in Table 3-6 is assumed to be fully taken up by other products such that the supply 
and demand in 2000 is in balance. Subsequently the use of metals in these other products 
has been scaled proportionally to GDP to make a rough estimate of the use of metals in 2050. 
The calculated total metal use is shown in Table 3-7. Also shown for reference is GDP growth 
(OECD, 2012).  
 
Table 3-7 Total global yearly metal demand for the actual year 2000, BAU 2050 scenario and Techno 2050 scenario all 
products. The supply data for Fe, Al, Cu, and Ni have been taken from EXIOBASE for the year 2000. The supply data for Cr, 
In, Nd, Dy and Li have been taken from USGS for the year 2000.    



















Fe 1.60 x 1011 4.50 x1011 4.80 x 1011 1.60 x 1011 1.00 2.82 3.01 
Al 2.29 x 1010 6.83 x 1010 7.83 x 1010 2.29 x 1010 1.00 2.98 3.42 
Cu 9.15 x 109 2.73 x 1010 3.62 x 1010 9.15 x 109 1.00 2.99 3.95 
Ni 4.36 x 108 1.41 x 109 1.31 x 109 4.36 x 108 1.00 3.23 3.01 
Cr 6.98 x 109 2.25 x 1010 2.23 x 1010 6.98 x 109 1.00 3.22 3.19 
In 5.73 x 105 1.85 x 106 1.88 x 106 5.73 x 105 1.00 3.22 3.28 
Nd 1.80 x 107 5.80 x 107 6.00 x 107 1.80 x 107 1.00 3.22 3.33 
Dy 1.00 x 105 3.22 x 105 3.65 x 105 1.00 x 105 1.00 3.22 3.65 
Li 3.82 x 108 1.23 x 109 1.63 x 109 3.82 x 108 1.00 3.22 4.26 
        
GDP     1.00 3.21 3.21 
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In Table 3-7 it can be seen that in the BAU scenario the demand for iron, nickel and 
chromium grows approximately as fast as GDP. The growth in nickel and chromium is for a 
large part coupled to that of iron as alloy elements in steel and stainless steel.   
In the TS the introduction of all kinds of CO2 emission reduction technologies raises the 
demand growth of aluminium, copper, indium, neodymium, dysprosium and lithium above 
the level of economic growth but not very much. The largest growth is seen in lithium where 
the demand growths a factor 4.3 in 35 years’ time (4.25% p.a.). Please notice that while the 
specific application of lithium in car batteries increases 2000 times, the overall demand 
growth of lithium is only a modest factor 4 (4% p.a.). The increase in lithium in car batteries is 
in reality likely less pronounced because our estimate of lithium use in car batteries for the 
actual year 2000 is very low compared the values reported by the lithium manufacturers 
(Roskill, 2009). It is reported that about 10% of the lithium is used in batteries. According 
Gruber et al. (2011) in 2007 about 25% of the lithium is used in batteries. In contrast to those 
number we calculate that about 0.1% if the produced lithium is used in batteries. In the 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Metal resource use in 2050 
The ball park high estimates for total metal use in 2050 as shown in Table 3-7 are rough 
guesses at best. The estimates are for a large part dominated by linear extrapolation of GDP 
growth and constant metal composition of general products. They incorporate for small part 
specific information on changing technology and associated metal content. It is therefore not 
a big surprise that the total estimated metal use increase closely follows expected GDP 
projections. The estimated increase in demand for metals is between 2–3% per year, which is 
well within bounds that can be met by suppliers, and this increase in demand is even a high 
estimate. These are rather modest growth percentages that are not out of the ordinary and it 
has been demonstrated in the past that such demand growth can readily be met by supply 
over longer times (Kleijn et al., 2012). Historical data on supply of iron, aluminium and copper 
(Kleijn et al., 2012) show that in the 20 years from 1995 and 2014 supply grew yearly 
between 20% - 28%. From this viewpoint, it seems that metal supply will in general be able to 
keep up with metal demand driven by a successful climate policy. 
However because of the generality of our assessment, for metals that are going to be used in 
an application for which there is going to be a large demand, supply constraints may apply. A 
small hint of this issue can be seen in the analysis made. For energy technologies that will see 
much larger application in the future and contain specific metals, the amount of metal going 
into the application grows quickly. We see this effect for the metals neodymium in energy 
technology and lithium in land vehicles. The application of neodymium in energy technology 
increases a factor 1800 (16% p.a.), the application of lithium in land vehicles increases a 
factor 162 (10% p.a.) from 2000 to 2050. These large increases of these specific metals in 
specific technologies are masked by the general use in other applications as shown in Table 
3-7. 
 
4.2 Metal resources used until 2050 
Using our assessment of the yearly metal demand in 2050 in the TC, a simple assessment can 
be made of the total amount of metals needed until 2050 by linear interpolation of the metal 
demand in 2000 and 2050. The estimates are highly dependent on the estimated use of 
metal in 2050 in the TC. Given that the TC is high mark for metal use in 2050, the total 
amount of metal reserves used until 2050 is a high mark as well. The estimated total 
cumulative demand for metals is given in Table 4-1. These amounts can be compared to the 
economic reserves that exist today. Economic reserves is defined that part of the reserve 
base which could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination. The 
term reserves need not signify that extraction facilities are in place and operative (USGS, 
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2015). The economic reserves that are available today can be seen as the amount of resource 
that for sure can be extracted until 2050 from a technical and economic point of view. 
Investment uncertainties and rate of opening these economic reserves might still be an issue. 
There might also be regulatory or political barriers that make exploitation problematic. The 
economic reserves are probably a low mark for the reserves that are available until 2050. 
Increasing metal prices, new technologies and new discoveries can only increase the amount 
of economic reserves. The economic reserves of the different metals have mostly been 
estimated based on figures given by the USGS (2015).  Indium reserves were taken from 
USGS (2007) and neodymium reserves were based on estimates of rare earth ores (USGS, 
2015) and assuming that the rare earth ores contain 18.5% neodymium (Bastnasite from 
Bayan Obo, Inner Mongolia, China (Zhang et al, 1982)). 
 
Table 4-1 Total global cumulative metal demand from 2000 until 2050 in the TS 2050. The cumulative demand was 
calculated by linear interpolation between the yearly demand for these metals in the actual year 2000 and the yearly 
demand for these metals in the TS 2050. The data on the economic reserves were mostly based on data given by the USGS  
2015. The data on Indium reserves were taken from the USGS (2007). Economic reserves for neodymium were based on 
aggregated rare earth reserves (USGS, 2015) and a rough estimate of the neodymium content of the rare earth ore 
currently processed in China (Zhang et al, 1982), the main supplier of neodymium.     
Element Unit Cumulative demand 
until 2050 – TS 2050 
Economic reserves  
≈ 2014 
Demand/reserve 
Fe kg 1.63 x 1013 8.70 x 1013 0.19 
Al kg 2.58 x 1012 7.41 x 1012 0.35 
Cu kg 1.16 x 1012 7.00 x 1011 1.65 
Ni kg 4.46 x 1010 8.10 x 1010 0.55 
Cr kg 7.46 x 1011 1.64 x 1011 4.54 
In kg 6.25 x 107 2.80 x 106 22.33 
Nd kg 1.99 x 109 9.56 x 109 0.21 
Li kg 5.13 x 1010 1.35 x 1010 3.80 
 
Interestingly the high mark for cumulative demand of iron, aluminium, nickel and 
neodymium until 2050 can be met by the currently know economic reserves of metals. It 
does not mean that no further development of mines is necessary but mines can probably 
provide these metals at roughly the same price as of today, because future demand can be 
satisfied by current known economic reserves. A more precise analysis can be made if supply 
curves are available but has not been carried out within the  scope of this study. For copper, 
chromium, indium, and lithium the current economic reserves as known today are not 
sufficient to provide the cumulative demand for metals until 2050. Metal prices have to 
increase or improvements in mining and refining technology have to be made to be able to 
expand the economic reserves to be able to satisfy cumulative demand until 2050 for these 
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metals. These economic reserves have to double for copper and increase twenty times for 
indium.  
This yearly expansion rate of the economic reserves of copper, chromium and lithium by 
technological progress and/or price increases, needed to be able to satisfy cumulative 
demand until 2050 is modest, between 1.4% and 4.3%. However for indium this increase is 
9% per year. Indium is a special case however. It is only produced as a by-product of zinc 
refining. Most zinc refineries do not yet extract indium in their process while they might do 
so if the price of indium increases, then expanding their supply. 
The cumulative demand/economic reserve ratio given in Table 4-1 is based on our uncertain 
but likely high mark for metal demand in 2050 and uncertain but probably low mark for 
economic reserves available in 2050. All in all it suggests that the availability of metals is not 
an essential bottleneck for the development of successful climate policies. A previous study 
on future supply and demand of lithium reported by Gruber et al. (2011) conclude, like we 
do, that lithium availability will not constrain the electrification of the automobile during the 
present century. Moreover it seems likely that iron, aluminium, nickel and neodymium can be 
supplied in 2050 at the same price as of today. Nonetheless these results are not a reason for 
complacency; mines have to be developed, and for some metals the economic reserve has to 
be expanded. There might be substantial challenges to expand the supply in a timely manner 
or there might be regulatory, political or market barriers to do so which will be further 
discussed below.  
 
4.3 Supply rate constraints 
As discussed in Section 4.1 the demand for metals increases up to a factor 4.2 for Lithium 
which is likely a high estimate. In Section 4.2 we saw that current economic reserves are 
sufficient for the supply of iron, aluminium, nickel and neodymium. For copper, chromium, 
indium and lithium the economic reserves have to be expanded. While the yearly increase in 
the supply needed to satisfy the demand are quite modest compared to recent historical 
data, there are reasons not to be complacent. 
o The opening up of a large deep open-cast mine can take decades. If the metal supply 
has to increase in a decades time, investments have to take place now while the 
return on investment is uncertain. 
o Expanding mines, even if it is to exploit current economic reserves, has negative local 
environmental consequences. Especially if these reserves are located in fragile 
environments. 
o For some metals new resources have to be found, possibly with lower metal ore 
concentrations than are currently available. Extracting metals from ore bodies with 
lower metal concentration means that more energy, water and auxiliary materials are 
needed to extract the metal leading to higher environmental impacts associated with 
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the mining of these new resources. In addition there will be extra local environmental 
impacts as well. Efficiency increases will counter these effects, more, or less.  
 
How fast mining capacity can be expanded is difficult to envisage. Although in general the 
rate of expansion needed to keep up with supply is similar to historical rates of expansion as 
found for aluminium and iron, short term imbalances between demand and supply may 
occur, see also Section 4.4 and 4.5.  
The uncertainty about return on investment will mean that mining corporations will be very 
cautious opening up new mines, especially in case of long gestation periods to full 
production. Uncertainty can be reduced, although very partially, by providing convincing 
long-term climate policy pathways. However as we have seen the demand for metals is for a 
large part driven by changes in infrastructure and ICT and not by changes in the energy 
system.  
Providing high quality public information on the coupling between climate policy pathways 
and expected demand for metals is essential for mining companies. Only by reducing the 
uncertainty about their return on investment, can they react to future changes in the 
demand for metals.  
  
4.4 Regulatory and political barriers 
Opening up new mines by definition means additional environmental impacts. These range 
from severe local environmental impacts as well as upstream impacts in the form of 
additional use of energy, water etc. Large open cast mines will forever change the way the 
landscapes look like. To keep the local environmental impacts within acceptable limits, 
governments may restrict the development of resources, driving up the price of the mining 
activities. On the other hand governments, in the search for extra revenues, might push the 
development of new mines, giving less attention to environmental and labour issues. 
The links between resource extraction, energy use and water resource use has been called 
the mineral-energy nexus (Giurco et al., 2014). Future regional food and water stress and 
political instability might make (economic) reserves unavailable creating a bottleneck in the 
supply of metals. Bleischwitz et al (2013) made an analysis of resource-rich countries with 
relevant reserves of strategic reserves that are politically unstable and where future food and 
water stress is likely. In these countries resource-driven conflicts that may be triggered by 
food and water shortages might escalate into socio-economic breakdowns with subsequent 
interruption of the supply chain of metals (Bleischwitz et al., 2013). An example of such a 
situation can be found in the Niger delta. The results of the analysis by Bleischwitz et al.,  
indicates that the likelihood of such interruptions is quite large. About 15 countries are at 
high risk of supply chain interruptions which might affect lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt, 
bauxite, iron and platinum. 
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To be able to better get to grips with the long-term mineral – energy nexus and broader 
sustainability issues surrounding resource use, Giuarco et al. (2014) proposes a research 
agenda that includes (1) taking a longer-term perspective (2) really take the linkages between 
resource extraction energy use and water use into account (3) responsible mining initiatives 
(4) mastering recycling technology in countries where the end use takes place. 
It is highly uncertain how regulatory and political barriers might influence the supply rate of 
metals. A level playing field for all mining operations seems to beneficial as it will make sure 
that the resources that can be developed with the least environmental impacts are brought 
into operation first. 
 
4.5 Markets and corporations 
Commodities that can only be produced with large upfront investments, investments that are 
only recouped in decades time, are naturally produced by a few global firms. Only these very 
big corporations are able to bear the large upfront investments in uncertain markets. 
Computer chips, fossil fuels and metal resources are examples of such commodities. Thus 
there is a natural tendency to form oligopoly or even monopoly market forms. By creating an 
oligopoly or monopoly market form uncertainty about future market prices are reduced 
because they can be influenced more or less by reducing or increasing supply. 
It is important to note that many basic commodity suppliers are state-owned or are closely 
tied to the state. The behaviour of the mining corporations might therefore not be influenced 
by market forces alone but also by political interests. Political interests might try to stifle 
foreign competition or create more favourable market conditions for their own industries. 
The natural tendency to form oligopolies or monopolies, although beneficial for the mining 
corporations, has its drawbacks. First of all, the corporations will seek out the best return on 
investment which will likely drive up prices for metals needed in the energy transition. 
Moreover metal supply might be supplied to certain industries creating barriers to a low 
carbon economy.  
In a competitive market with multiple suppliers, metal prices will likely fluctuate strongly. 
 
4.6 Substitutability 
4.6.1 Elemental and resource substitution 
There are two reasons to substitute one element for another. One is that the alternative 
element provides extra functionality. The second is that the alternative element is cheaper 
but often at the cost of functionality. Innovation often leads to elemental substitution 
improving the characteristics of materials. As a response to the threat of material scarcity 
most of today’s scientific and engineering research is aimed at elemental substitution. 
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Elemental substitution holds great promise to alleviate metal resource constraints specially if 
the alternative element is an abundant element such as carbon.  
4.6.2 Functional substitution and dematerialization 
Examples of functional substitution are the replacement of photographic film by digital 
photography and the replacement of paper mail and fax by email (Kleijn et al., 2012). In 
general the relative importance of materials has changed considerably in the economy some 
increased and other decreased. However in absolute and per capita terms. the consumption 
has increased. The amounts of stone and bronze and iron we use now is much higher than in 
the ages named after these materials. This is the same for energy. Oil and natural gas have 
not in absolute terms replaced coal. They have just been additional to coal (Kleijn et al., 
2012). Thus it seems that functional substitution has not lead to an absolute decrease in 
metal resource use in the long-term. However it certainly has contributed to a reduced 
absolute growth in metal resources. Looking at long term global trends of iron, aluminium 
and copper ore the period after WWII can be characterised as the period in which metal use 
per capita increased sharply until the oil crisis in the beginning of the 1970s (Kleijn et al., 
2012). Of course, absolute ore production increased also because population grew as well. 
From the beginning of the 1970s until the beginning of the 21st century, the  
Dematerialisation is used to describe a process that leads to a decrease in the amount of 
material to fulfil a certain function. There are several ways to achieve this. Two concepts that 
might lead to dematerialisation are miniaturisation and the service economy. 
Miniaturisation has been very prominent in the form of ever smaller and more powerful 
computer chips as used in electronics and computers. However it is not so clear if this 
miniaturisation has led to reduced material use  from a lifecycle perspective. The amount of 
energy and materials to create these ever smaller chips has increased. Another mechanism 
that reduces the effect of miniaturisation is that these smaller devices  can be used in ever 
more appliances creating additional demand for electronic appliances. Miniaturisation 
created a market for mp3 players but also brought the need for new infrastructures such as 
2G, 3G and 4G networks with all its associated metal resource requirements in the form of 
millions of cell phone towers, land lines and data warehouses.  
The service economy also holds out promise for dematerialisation the economy. Car-sharing 
schemes is one such example. Another example is the use of e-services where newspapers, 
magazines or books are delivered in electronic form and read on a e-ink device. Not much is 
known about the reduced metal resource use of service economy solutions but some 
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4.7 Recycling 
Recycling can be seen as a way to expand the economic reserves with the stocks that are 
available within society, so-called urban mining. However up to 2011 less than 1% of the REEs 
were actually recycled (Binnemans et al., 2013). Recycling rates of rare-earths are so low 
because the technology to recycle at a cost effective price is lacking and because of the 
diffuse application of the rare earths. 
For instance recycling of neodymium from magnets in computer hard drives, a high quality 
concentrated source of neodymium magnets, cannot be made cost-effective (Sprecher et al., 
2014). However it has been established that recycling will always be an improvement over 
primary production, the large losses of material incurred while shredding the material puts 
serious doubts on the usefulness of this type of recycling as a solution for scarcity. 
Furthermore, our LCA also shows that technological progress can make a significant 
difference in the environmental impact of producing neodymium magnets from primary 
sources (Sprecher et al., 2014). In general REE recycling can reduce the environmental 
challenges associated with REE mining and processing (Binnemans et al 2013).  
For bulk metals that are mainly used in infrastructure such as iron, aluminium and copper 
current recycling rates are already significant and the build-up of infrastructure (at least in 
the Europe and America) has for a large part already taken place. Recycling of in these cases 
can  be an important supply source in 2050. Pauliuk et al. (2013) examined steel supply and 
demand for the 21st century and predicts that secondary steel production will more than 
double by 2050, and it may surpass primary production between 2050 and 2060. Recycling of 
iron could therefore lower the demand for iron ore significantly.  
In 2010 secondary aluminium could already supply 30% of global demand and it is expected  
to supply 30% of global demand by 2020 (International Aluminium Institute, 2009) thus 
lowering the demand for primary aluminium. 
In our model we have a poor view on recycling cycles and hence primary demand. However 
this shortcoming only strengthens our conclusion that supply can keep up with demand 
because demand is overestimated. Nonetheless for a better insight into future primary 
supply it is essential to integrate primary and secondary supply in scenarios and to establish 
inter-linkages with macro-economic modelling. 
While recycling does not seem to alleviate rare earth bottlenecks in the near future because 
so little rare earth waste leaves the economy at the moment compared to demand (rising 
demand and long life times of products imply that the amount of rare earths in the waste 
stage is a fraction of primary demand). So the recycling rates are low compared to primary 
demand. Yet, it is important to invest in the technology. In a steady-state economy, recycling 
can be an important source of supply while likely having smaller environmental impacts.  
For bulk metals, recycling is already important and likely will become a dominant source for 
metals by 2050. However important issues remain such as the quality of the recycled metals 
(Nakamura et al., 2012). More research is needed to see in how far secondary sources can 
provide high quality alloys. 
 
Page 33  |  Resource constraints in successful climate policy 
 
4.8 Missing information 
Additional research is needed on the metal requirements of the energy technologies like bio-
energy, with and without CCS and combined heat and power (CHP). However the amount of 
CHP that is required is so low that it will probably not have a significant impact on the results. 
Additionally data needs to be found for the metal requirements of iron and aluminium of 
nuclear electricity. 
Furthermore, more general data could be found for some of the energy technologies, since 
some of the metal requirements are based on case studies, such as for advanced solar power 
and PV iron and aluminium requirements. This can also explain why the requirements for iron 
and aluminium of PV are so high in comparison to the other energy technologies. 
For a lot of rare earth metals the analytical framework could not be fully completed, keeping 
open the possibility that future supply and demand of these metals are a bottleneck. 
In addition the research might not include the data requirements for all subtypes of the types 
of energy, like the data for iron and aluminium for wind energy, which is based on a research 
that focuses on onshore wind and does not take into account offshore wind.  
Nevertheless, in any investigation the results of the metal requirements are always 
influenced by the decisions made in the research such as the system boundary, lifetime, 
location, etc. Because the requirements are based on researches performed by others, there 
will be a large variation in these assumptions between the different studies. 
Another point to be considered is that installing most of the electricity forms require large 
amounts of metals in the installation and mostly only a little amount of metals during 
operation. Since the scenarios only look at a single year it is very well possible that the 
required metals were already necessary during installation earlier than 2050. An alternative 
to solve this issue is to investigate the required extra electricity capacity.    
The results of this research can be used to estimate the global demand of metals if it is 
combined with the growth and demand of metal requirements of other sectors. As 
mentioned earlier a development that needs to be considered and is described in the 
scenarios is the application CCS to other forms of industry. When estimating metal demand in 
the future, this can then be used to compare with current metal production and how much 
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5 Conclusions 
Demand and supply of metals until 2050 under influence of successful climate policy is highly 
uncertain. By examining corner cases it can be established that for iron, aluminium, nickel 
and neodymium the supply until 2050 will probably easily keep up with demand. If there are 
no regulatory and/or political constraints for expanding current mines or exploiting new 
economic reserves, it is likely that the prices of these metals will not increase substantially in 
the long run. For several rare earth metals the analytical framework could not be fully 
completed, keeping open the possibility that future supply and demand of these metals 
constitute a bottleneck. 
Providing high quality public information on the coupling between climate policy pathways 
and expected demand for metals is essential for mining companies to react to future changes 
in the demand for metals and might reduce their uncertainty about their return on 
investment. 
A level playing field for all mining operations seems to beneficial as it will make sure that the 
most attractive resources that can be developed, with the least environmental impacts are 
brought into operation first. 
Oligopolistic or monopolistic market tendencies have to be counteracted to prevent build-up 
of too much power to influence markets, specifically if the oligopolistic/monopolistic firm has 
close ties to governments. In a competitive market metal prices will likely strongly fluctuate. 
Recycling of the rare earths likely will play a small role in the supply of rare earths. Recycling 
rates will likely be rather low the coming decades because of the diffuse application of these 
metals in difficult to separate matrices. Also as long as society is building up stocks in the 
form of products in use, the return flow can only be modest in comparison with the new 
supply. For bulk metals, secondary sources are already important and will become more 
important or even dominant by 2050. It is important to get a better view on the long–term 
amount and quality of secondary sources, possibly by integrating primary and secondary 
supply in scenarios and link this to macro-economic modelling.  
Elemental substitution can play a large role in diminishing (temporarily) the need for some 
metals. 
 The most policy relevant conclusions are: Predictability of effectiveness of climate policy 
is a key factor in having adequate future supply, especially for metals where lead time to 
new mine production is long. 
 Public research on substitution options for highly critical metals can reduce constraints. 
 Functioning global markets reduce supply risks of critical metals, especially as compared 
to bilateral contracting. 
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